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The Creolizing Genre of SF and the Nightmare of Whiteness 
 in John W. Campbell’s “Who Goes There?” 




The alien in science fiction has not often been seen as part of an imperial colonial discourse. By 
examining John W. Campbell’s founding golden age SF text, “Who Goes There?” (1938), this paper 
explores the ways in which the alien adheres to an invisible mythos of whiteness that has come to be 
seen through a colonizing logic as isomorphic with the human. Campbell’s alien-monster comes to 
disseminate and invade both self and world and as such serves as an interrogation of what whites 
have done through colonization. It is thus part and parcel of imperial domination and discourse and 
appears as the very nightmare of whiteness in the form of its liminal and estranged shadow side. Part 
of what has made Campbell’s text so influential is that it offers a new type of alien invasion in the 
figure of “contagion,” which speaks “to the transition from colonial to postcolonial visions of 
modernity and its attendant catastrophes” (Rieder, 124), and which can be further examined as a 
race metaphor in American SF—indeed, as the white man’s fear of racial mixing that has a long and 
dehumanizing history. Through its threat of mixture, I read the alien as a creolizing figure that both 
troubles and undoes the white/black, human/nonhuman binary in science fiction, which I also read 
as being a creolizing, i.e., hybrid and plastic, genre. 
 
 
The alien in science fiction has not often been seen as part of an imperial colonial discourse. 
By examining John W. Campbell’s founding golden age SF text, “Who Goes There?” (1938) 
which has been hailed as “the first story of modern science fiction,” and “the prototype for 
SF to come” (Panshin and Panshin, 253, 309), this paper explores the ways in which the 
alien adheres to an invisible mythos of whiteness that has come to be seen through a 
colonizing logic as isomorphic with the human. Campbell’s alien-monster comes to 
disseminate and invade both self and world and as such serves as an interrogation of what 
whites have done through colonization. It is thus part and parcel of imperial domination 
and discourse and appears as the very nightmare of whiteness in the form of its liminal and 
estranged shadow side. Part of what has made Campbell’s text so influential is that it offers 
a new type of alien invasion narrative in the figure of “contagion,” which speaks “to the 
transition from colonial to postcolonial visions of modernity and its attendant 
catastrophes” (Rieder, 124). Isiah Lavender III has further examined the trope of contagion 
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as a race metaphor in American SF, as the white man’s fear of racial mixing that has a long 
and dehumanizing history. Through its threat of mixture, I read the alien as a creolizing 
figure that at once troubles and dismantles the white/black, human/nonhuman binary in 
science fiction, which is itself a creolizing, i.e., hybrid and plastic, genre. It should be noted, 
however, that this alien thread of contagion is just that, one thread. There are many types 
of aliens in science fiction, perhaps an infinite number of them. And yet the alien is all too 
often seen as the other to the self (Malmgren) and so one must interrogate who this self is 
and the type of “human” it stands in for. Gary Westfahl has stated that, “one can probe the 
nature of humanity with aliens that by contrast illustrate and comment on human nature” 
(Westfahl, 16) and Brian Aldiss suggests that the “essential American obsession” with the 
alien is linked to that of “self-identity” (Aldiss and Wingrove, 119). Seeing “humanity” 
through the lens of white colonialist ideology helps us to understand the type of “human 
nature” that the alien helps to “illustrate and comment on,” which in this paper is linked to 
fear, hatred, and bigotry. The same goes for the notion of “self-identity” as it relates to the 
U.S., which is a national identity that historically has sought to safeguard a myth of purity 
linked to whiteness and what it means to be fully human. 
Dualistic Thinking and Creolization 
I start by examining the dualistic nature of the SF genre in relation to the human and 
whiteness. In his book Alien Encounters: The Anatomy of Science Fiction, Mark Rose 
proposes a fundamental dualism of the genre, arguing that the opposition of human versus 
nonhuman constitutes the very paradigm of science fiction. He writes that while “at the 
level of theme and motif, science fiction seems bewilderingly diverse,” at a more abstract 
level “we can observe the way the concern with the human in relation to the nonhuman 
projects itself through four logically related categories: which I shall call space, time, 
machine, and monster” (32). While the last term is what I primarily focus on here, “the 
nonhuman” located “within humanity” (33), Rose reads all four types of alien encounters, 
the temporal, the spatial, the manmade, and the monstrous as leading to “a metamorphosis 
of humanity.” Such a metamorphosis, then, is brought on only through alien contact and the 
mixture that such contact entails. And yet, as Rose notes, SF does not merely sustain the 
“human versus nonhuman opposition” but “simultaneously and continuously” subverts it, 
“generating fables that transfigure both the idea of nonhuman and the idea of the human” 
(49). He goes on to state that “the space that the genre inhabits is not a prison, rigid and 
unyielding, but a flexible and dynamic field of semantic tension. It is this condition that 
makes a living genre possible” (49). Rose here is attentive to the plasticity and dynamism of 
genre that shatters dualistic thinking—the us vs. them way of thinking. In Race in American 
Science Fiction, Lavender III reads Rose’s human/nonhuman opposition as indicating a 
white/black dualism. He coins the term “blackground” in order to foreground “critical 
discussions of the black/white binary” (Lavender III, 6). He utilizes the binary as a way of 
“race-reading” science fiction in regards to the genre’s “extrapolations of slavery, 
segregation and contagion narratives” as well as specific concepts of his own invention like 
“ethnoscapes and technicities” (14). Race and blackness in particular, he states, “is always 
in the background of this historically ‘white’ genre” (19) and he seeks to bring to the 
surface neglected issues of blackness in a seemingly monochromatic genre. While 
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Lavender’s work provides deep insight into the racial operations of science fiction, his 
approach to the genre, as he himself admits, “locks” him “into the classic white/black racial 
binary” (19). And yet the figure of alien as I read it not only blurs the division, but collapses 
it. Before my analysis of Campbell’s text, however, the dualistic thinking proposed by Rose 
and Lavender must be understood more through a philosophical and creolizing lens that, in 
abstracting the notion of racial and cultural mixture and applying prescriptively to various 
discursive fields, offers a way of thinking about the world and self that erodes the purity of 
the Eurocentric notion of the human and the conceptions of reason associated with it. 
In contrast to the common assertion of SF as a “historically ‘white’ genre” as 
Lavender III avers, and as I note in the introduction above, I read science fiction as a 
creolizing form that specifically arises out of the historical processes of colonialism. In 
“Creolization in the Making of the Americas,” the Caribbean philosopher and poet Édouard 
Glissant asserts that “The slave trade brought to the Caribbean the determining fact of the 
African population. This experience of diversity, and the long-unnoticed process it 
spawned, I label ‘creolization’” (Glissant, 82). In his seminal work, Colonialism and the 
Emergence of Science Fiction, John Rieder argues that science fiction emerges in the late 
19th to early 20th century as an extension of colonialism and as such can be seen as part of 
what Glissant calls the “long-unnoticed process” of creolization that colonialism “spawned.” 
The political theorist Jane Anna Gordon explains that, while “the word creole dates back to 
the 1500s to name people of mixed blood, creolization emerged in its descriptive mode in 
the nineteenth century to explain what were seen as unique and aberrational human 
symbolic forms borne of plantation societies primarily in the New World” (Gordon, 169). 
One can see how the “unique and aberrational human symbolic forms” are then 
transplanted as an extraterrestrial and existential threat in science fiction, the latter of 
which emerges within the same century as the former. Rieder’s work elucidates how SF 
from its coalescence as a genre is always already a mixture that arises from contact with 
the colonized and racialized other. He argues that for early English language science fiction, 
colonialism is a significant historical context, and explores the ways in which early science 
fiction “lives and breathes in the atmosphere of colonial history and its discourses” (Rieder, 
2–3), dissecting how “some of the racism endemic to colonialist discourses is woven into 
the texture of science fiction” (97). One such example is how outer space is treated “as an 
infinitely extended ocean” separating “exotically diverse continents” instead of “radically 
different worlds” (147). Rieder neither defines science fiction nor assigns it a specific origin 
or ur-text but instead focuses on the genre’s “emergence” by which he means the period 
roughly between 1870 and the start of WWII, which was when the genre was coalescing 
into what eventually “came to be named science fiction” in the 1920s (15–16). It is during 
this coalescing period that racist colonial ideology governed by the evolutionary theory and 
anthropology of social Darwinism pervades early science fiction. And it is through such 
ideology that the colonizing project can be seen as extending the realms of humanity, that 
is, bringing “humanity” to the colonized, however static, closed-off and so dehumanizing 
this concept is within its Eurocentric framing. As Frantz Fanon informs us in Les Damnés de 
la Terre, the flipside of the colonizing project indeed is one of utter dehumanization, 
allotting the damned colonized to a sub- or non-human level, which is what the strand of  
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alien examined here is literally subjected to. Thus, Rose’s assertion (32) that SF operates on 
a “human versus nonhuman opposition” takes on deeper signification as the operating logic 
of colonialism. And yet it is this binary that the creolizing genre of science fiction subverts 
through its own hybrid construction already indicated in its name alone as a cross-
pollination of two distinct fields, science—which seeks to establish a clear division between 
truth and falsity—and fiction—which through its mythic lens and dynamic play of ideas 
calls into question such clear-cut division. The breakdown of the binary is moreover 
manifested in the genre’s (re)production of hybrids, cyborgs, and other forms of illicit 
mixtures that disrupt the mythos of whiteness and purity that have been linked to the 
human itself. 
At the core of dualistic thinking, which is an essential and inextricable part of the 
operations of colonialism, is the question of purity, which extends beyond racial categories 
to the category of the human itself. More specifically it relies on what the philosopher 
Michael J. Monahan has termed the “politics of purity.” In his book, The Creolizing Subject: 
Race, Reason and the Politics of Purity, he examines the “pure” categories of race and racism 
vis-à-vis the category of the human, calling for an epistemic openness that more 
appropriately mirrors the indeterminate, dynamic and ambiguous nature of the human. At 
the conceptual level, Monahan writes, the politics of purity “demands that every racial 
category have clear boundaries along with distinct and unambiguous criteria for 
membership. Each category must thus be pure in that it describes or captures all and only 
members of that category” (79–80) and so any instances of ambiguity that would put each 
category into question poses a problem that must be overcome. Monahan emphasizes that 
what he describes is not the reality of purity but its politics and points to how it polices the 
boundaries of the human as well: 
While the norm for all racial categories in the abstract is one of purity, in practice, 
the use (and abuse) of such categories is always in the service of white purity . . . 
whiteness has functioned, and continues to function, within a politics of purity, as at 
once a kind of universal human norm, and as a specific embodiment of the highest 
manifestation of human reason and virtue. It is, in other words, a specific and 
exclusionary moral, material, and aesthetic norm passing itself off as the universal 
truth of the human. Whiteness is thus pure not only as a category but also insofar as 
it describes the purest manifestation of the human—to be purely white is to be 
purely human, and to be less than white is to be less than human. (84)  
All forms of racial mixture, then, are held by racist cultural practices to be, as Monahan 
asserts, “morally odious, but the highest levels of censure were reserved for the so-called 
pollution of the white race” (84, emphasis mine). So, protecting the white race in all its 
purity and exclusivity is tantamount to protecting the “virtue of humanity itself” in its 
highest and purest form. I can think of no other place in fiction where this plays out so 
vividly than in the genre of SF, specifically in invasion contagion narratives where what is 
at stake is the protection of humanity in all its white purity. In this SF trope, the human is 
seen as a form of epistemic closure, which is how racism, geared as it is towards 
dehumanization, is achieved. 
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Monahan dissects how racism closes off racial categories as being static and eternal 
rather than in “flux” and as a “manifestation of becoming,” the true nature of the human as 
a dynamic, evolving creature. Monahan argues that, “racial categories are ambiguous, 
describing what are best only ever tenuous and indistinct boundaries . . . individual agents 
can be of multiple categories simultaneously, yet, insofar as the categories themselves 
remain in flux, are never fully purely of any particular category” (136). He emphasizes the 
ambiguity and plurality of racial meaning in an effort to move away from the discourse of 
the “all-or-nothing thinking of the politics of purity” (137). Within this dualistic all-or-
nothing discourse, even mixed raced people can be fixed to the category of “mixed raced” 
such as in the instance of the creole, which conforms perfectly within the politics of purity. 
You either belong to one category, including a fixed mixed one, or to none at all. For 
Monahan, however, not only are racial categories themselves dynamic and unstable, but so 
is racism itself, even if it does hold a sort of metastability: “Racism is dynamic and unstable 
insofar as the world cannot live up to the standards of fixity and stability it sets, but it is 
still itself relatively stable in a given time and place (or rather metastable), just as racial 
categories themselves, though always dynamic and in a process of constant revision, are 
relatively stable in a particular moment and location” (152). He further states that 
Insofar as racism stands as a kind of commitment to epistemic closure, as an effort 
to define oneself and others essentially within a closed and fixed normative 
framework, when we are better understood as open-ended and dynamic, it is 
dehumanizing. Thus, racism stands as a kind of failure to more fully realize one’s 
humanity by turning away from confrontation with openness and ambiguity and 
instead clinging vainly to purified notions of humanity and value. (152, emphasis in 
original.) 
Racism, in part, turns away from “openness and ambiguity” because “instability, ambiguity, 
and indeterminacy are so threatening that one throws oneself into these ossified systems 
of value” (151). The real harm of racism, then, “lies not in its offering of content for 
interpretation and assignation of meaning and value, but in presenting those 
interpretations, meanings and values as fixed and given” (154). The alien depicted in 
Campbell’s text, as I discuss in what follows, possesses precisely the traits of “instability, 
ambiguity, and indeterminacy” that pose a major threat to the white male scientists that 
indeed read the alien as “morally odious” since it calls into question “purified notions of 
humanity and value.” Thus, undergirding the human(white)/nonhuman(black) binary is 
the very discourse of the “all-or-nothing thinking of the politics of purity,” which posits one 
as being all human or not human at all; there is no in-between. I turn now to the text itself 
to examine the ways in which the SF genre allows this racist, colonial discourse of purity to 
unravel and turn in on itself. 
Who Goes There? The Nightmare of Whiteness 
Campbell’s novella, “Who Goes There?” (1938), originally written under the pen name Don 
A. Stuart, has been adapted multiple times into film starting from The Thing from Another 
World (1951) to notably John Carpenter’s The Thing (1982), and more recently as a prequel 
to Carpenter’s version of the same name (2011). Its influence is also seen in other invasion 
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contagion films such as Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956) and the entire Alien franchise 
(1979–2017). The story is set deep within the icy and deadly white landscape of Antarctica, 
where a group of scientists on an expedition discover an ancient alien beast that has been 
frozen for “twenty million years.” The biologist Blair makes the case that they should thaw 
out the alien to better examine it, but once they have, the taken-for-dead-alien-monster 
comes back to life and escapes. The scientists soon discover its psychic powers of telepathy 
and superhuman abilities to shape shift, indicating dynamism and plasticity. This being is 
contagious and through immediate contact can take over the protoplasm of any living 
creature, cow, dog, bird, even human, converting it into its own kind while still imitating 
the exact appearance and capabilities of the original. What its own kind is exactly remains a 
mystery; it is ambiguous at its core, but it imitates man perfectly, and its plasticity and 
indeterminacy poses a major threat to the group of scientific explorers and to the entire 
world if the “unearthly monster” makes it out of the deep and frozen wilderness and begins 
to proliferate itself endlessly with any species on earth. In other words, it must be 
contained within the very whiteness of the story’s setting. Fearing the men that have been 
“absorbed” by the alien, the scientists come up with a blood test to determine who is 
human and no longer is. The blood of the inhuman monster will hiss and flee when touched 
by a live wire, revealing the “absorbed” men who are then immediately put to death. In the 
end, the remaining scientists discover Blair, who initiated the thawing of the alien and had 
been isolated in a shed, transfigured into a hideous “thing” working on an anti-gravity and 
atomic device, presumably to take over the world. We are told he was within a half hour of 
completing it and taking over the world before the scientists destroy it and save the planet 
and humanity itself from a complete (albeit invisible) alien invasion at the eleventh hour. 
The story’s geographical setting alone already speaks to an important dimension of 
how science fiction generally and this “modern” invasion contagion narrative specifically 
employs the dualistic thinking of human/racial purity, at the same time it deeply troubling 
it. Early in the story, when one of the scientists first discovers the “alien monster” on the 
white frozen tundra, we are told, “At the surface—it was a white death. Death of a needle-
fingered cold driven before the wind, sucking heat from any warm thing. Cold—and white 
mist of endless, everlasting drift, the fine, fine particles of snow that obscured all things” 
and a short while later a reiteration: “Cold white death . . . streamed across the ground [and] 
blinded him in twenty seconds. He stumbled wildly in circles” (294, emphasis mine). What 
we have here is both a troubled and troubling whiteness. Death is depicted as white and 
cold (i.e., heartless), obscuring “all things.” It is within this setting that the white male 
scientists will turn on themselves and commit murder for the sake of some pure ideological 
construct of what it means to be human. Because it is not the cold white and deadly terrain 
itself that kills but the scientists themselves, it can be seen as an apt racial metaphor: 
whiteness here indeed “blinds” the men through the white ideology of the pure human, and 
further “obscures all things” including the impure alien-other that has been held deep 
within the whiteness of the terrain for millions of years. In other words, whiteness has 
carried within itself an “impurity” that it has obscured all along since its very beginning 
when “Antarctica was beginning to freeze” (293). And yet a close reading of the text 
indicates it is not the thing itself that is impure and abhorrent but rather the very act of 
obscuring and blinding that constitutes the corruption. As with most SF contagion 
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narratives and as stated above, the notion of the human operates on the all-or-nothing 
notion of purity. Either one is purely human or the contamination of the Other places one in 
the category of the inhuman, which must then be wiped from existence. But in this 
deconstruction of the story’s white setting, one can see that the notion of “purity” holds a 
deeper impurity obscured within which reveals the purity of whiteness to be what it has 
always been: a myth. Further, the deadly whiteness of the text’s setting foreshadows the 
human agents that through their pseudo-scientific rationale are the ones that will act in a 
deadly, inhuman way. 
More specifically, the scientists act through what Lavender III reads as racial 
paranoia as can be read by their “blood” test that proves the purity of the humans, which of 
course invokes the “one-drop rule” ingrained in the United States’ social construction of 
race. Such a hideously racist lens operates on the all-or-nothing mentality of racial purity 
and denies the creolizing praxis of the human. Lavender III has emphasized that the story 
cannot be divorced from the overt racism of Campbell, the story’s author. Despite being an 
influential editor and writer “singlehandedly shaping science fiction in its golden years by 
editing Astounding, the most influential SF pulp magazine of the 1940s and 1950s,” his 
legacy has been tarnished by his being “a racist, a bigot, a sexist, and an anti-Semite” (Gary 
Westfahl quoted in Lavender, 134). Lavender III further notes, 
Campbell’s often inflammatory editorials sometimes berated the intelligence of 
other races, particularly blacks, and probed his inflexibility as a person capable of 
changing with the social currents of mid-century America. In one column, for 
example, regarding the first Brown decision (1954), Campbell declares that men are 
not created equal by God, that they are separated by intelligence, that the white race 
has a higher allocation of intelligence and ability compared to the black race on a 
distribution curve… (134) 
Campbell was not only in favor for “rigidly segregated schools” but also opposed the civil 
rights for African Americans in 1960s, going “so far as to support the infamous presidential 
bid of Governor George Wallace of Alabama” (134). With this background in mind, 
Lavender III asserts that “Campbell’s greatest fear is perhaps the demise of white humanity 
by exposure to a single drop of black blood. Such a fear is represented by the alien shape-
changer, who can pass not only for human but for an American white male.” As such, the 
“presumed blood contamination by the thing can be and must be read as racism because 
the thing is decidedly not human. While the thing is an alien other, the thing must be 
reconfigured as the racial other if Campbell’s history is taken into account” (134–5). Given 
that the thing’s contagion does not indicate a literal death of the body but rather death to a 
rigid way of being, the scientists’ paranoid reactions and methods of dealing with the alien 
are undoubtedly racist to the core, and yet the story as a whole seems to remain conscious 
of its own white madness. One must question here what gives the scientists the moral 
authority to take the life of their colleagues based on the contamination of the alien’s touch. 
The answer seems to rely on the exteriority of the alien, or rather its initial first impression, 
which imprints the white male scientists with fear and hate. 
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Before discussing its initial exteriority, one important element needs to emphasized 
from Campbell’s story that differs and in fact is effaced from Carpenter’s more popular film 
version, and this is that the alien-monster-thing is not hostile or violent in and of itself. As 
the hero McReady states: “It doesn’t fight. I don’t think it ever fights. It must be a peaceable 
thing, in its own—inimitable—way. It never had to, because it always gained its end—
otherwise” (336). And yet, in the story its threat is so great that there is never an attempt to 
scientifically investigate the nature and cause of its shapeshifting abilities. The racial 
hysteria associated with the myth of purity prevents the scientists from welcoming the 
alien and learning from its technology. The rejection of its impure-because-plastic form is 
also at once a dismissal of any higher intelligence it might possess; instead, to go back to 
Lavender’s assertion of Campbell’s racism, the characters must prove that the “white race 
has a higher allocation of intelligence” than its thingified, liminal other. If the alien stands in 
for the opposite side of Man—the other to the self—then it is “peaceable” in direct 
opposition to the brutality and violence of Man. In not having to “fight” to achieve its end, 
unlike Man and his countless wars, not to say his genocidal impulses evident in the text, the 
alien shows itself as possessing a higher form of intelligence that allows for a peaceful way 
of living through mere bodily contact, a persuasive touch that is neither violent nor hostile. 
Along with its malleability, there are its powers of telepathy, which is to say its indigenous 
praxis that transgresses set scientific limits and that is left not only unexplored but also 
dismissed under the racial colonizing logic of the scientists who only value their own form 
of intelligence and superiority. In the end, the scientists learn to organize and work 
together to defeat the lone monster alien. The group of scientists can only defeat the 
threatening yet peaceable alien via its isolating status as an anomaly, for the alien acts 
singularly, in a singular way (“inimitable”) but also singly. The men, on the other hand, at 
least those that stayed alive, work collectively. As the Panshins note, in opposition to the 
humans, “the horrific alien, even though it might be both telepathic and originally one 
being, was not able to join its various parts together to take concerted action. Indeed its 
selfishness and egoism were . . . complete” (Panshin, 456). Within the story the alien is 
repeatedly stated as being selfish because “every part of it is all for itself” (Campbell, 344). 
What makes a monster a monster is both its singularity as well as its solitariness, the 
totalizing of the event as something utterly singular and alone, so of course the monster 
acts without help. One of the lessons that Mary Shelley’s classic monster text, 
Frankenstein—not coincidentally one of the ur-texts of the SF genre—so clearly imparts to 
us is that monsters have no friends. Monsters—and in this story this is no exception—are 
read as selfish for simply wanting to live, to be allowed to live freely, which paradoxically 
humanizes them. In Campbell’s story, there is something in the alien monster itself that is 
human in that it can imitate Man so flawlessly, which also suggests that it might know Man 
better than Man knows himself. Its powers over matter illustrate a more advanced and 
pliable technology that poses a threat to Man’s supremacy and his own supposedly higher 
intelligence. But more specifically it threatens the “closed and fixed normative framework” 
of the human that Monahan links to racism’s commitment to epistemic closure (Monahan, 
152), and as such the “open-ended and dynamic” shapeshifting alien that troubles this 
framework must be annihilated at all costs. 
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In its true essence, the form of this powerful entity is nonexistent and yet, in order 
to explicitly establish its monstrosity marking it as something that is, to use Monahan’s 
term, morally odious, it is given form at the beginning of the story in its frozen state: “Three 
mad, hate-filled eyes blazed up with the living fire, bright as fresh-spilled blood from a face 
ringed with a writhing, loathsome nest of worms, blue, mobile worms that crawled where 
hair should grow” (301–302). The initial appearance of the alien, which may or may not be 
its “natural form,” is genuinely hideous in its Lovecraftian monstrosity (the connection here 
is not fortuitous as Lovecraft’s racism is well established), and more importantly time and 
again we are told of the mad hate in its face: “If you can judge the look on its face—it isn’t 
human so maybe you can’t—it was annoyed when it froze. Annoyed, in fact, is about as 
close an approximation of the way it felt as crazy, mad, insane hatred” (299). Its deformed, 
impure, and angry exteriority helps to mark it as evil and malevolent toward the human 
species for both the scientists and the reader. Its three eyes mark a multiplicity that goes 
against the natural laws of nature. But why might it be so annoyed and angry—“Mad? It 
was mad clear through—searing, blistering mad!” (299)— is a question that remains 
unanswered and yet we can deduce a possibility through the description of its “mad, hate 
filled eyes” blazing up “with the living fire, bright as fresh-spilled blood.” Blood, as stated 
above, plays a central role in the story, as it is through testing blood that the purity of 
“human” is proven. But in this description of “fresh-spilled blood” early on, we have an 
indication of a possible past wrong (done shortly before the alien froze); the beast is angry 
because of blood spilled, presumably that of its own kind. And this primordial anger is 
coming back to life with “living fire.” The “crawling” blue worms-for-hair also indicates 
death and decay being reanimated. The reader is asked, then, to speculate briefly on a 
possible haunting and return, but not much more. After all, this is no ghost story, but the 
open-ended nature of the thing’s origins speaks to how the SF genre allows for a 
conception of time that cannot be closed off. The alien’s look inspires a conversation 
between Blair and Connant, another scientist, regarding its “evil nature.” Blair tells Connant 
“just because its nature is different, you haven’t any right to say it’s necessarily evil,” to 
which the latter, looking at the frozen thing, responds with “Haw! It may be that things 
from other worlds don’t have to be evil just because they’re different. But that thing was! 
Child of Nature, eh? Well, it was a hell of an evil Nature” (306). Despite Blair’s argument 
against the thing’s evilness, the team of scientists regard it as a malevolent entity of “an evil 
Nature” based on its hideous and impure looks alone. Its look, informed by underlying 
racial paranoia, is what gives the scientists the moral authority to kill. The initial exteriority 
of the alien monster soon gives way to a repugnant interiority in the men, which allows 
them to kill one another remorselessly, all in the service of protecting all of “humanity.” 
By the time the scientists manage to destroy the alien in its monstrous form, it has 
potentially taken over the shape of any number of the sled dogs or the men themselves, and 
from then on, the alien entity ceases to be a physical perversion and becomes something 
more akin to a spiritual and metaphysical corruption. Connant, the first person to notice the 
missing beast, is put into question as perhaps no longer being human and soon afterward, 
the men start to question one other’s humanity: “Is that man next to me an inhuman 
monster?” (343, emphasis in the original). The move from human to nonhuman is swift and 
automatic. Each man questions the other but also their own self: one man asks, “‘Hey, Mac. 
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Mac, would I know if I was a monster? Would I know if the monster had already got me? Oh 
lord, I may be a monster already.’ ‘You’d know,’ McReady answered. ‘But we wouldn’t,’ 
Norris laughed shortly, half-hysterically” (331). The supposed death by contagion here is 
called into question in the men not knowing whether or not they would know if their 
humanity was killed off. The alien does not produce but rather disrupts and illuminates the 
corruption of the human genre when seen as a static and given genre. The fact is that in the 
end, fifteen men out of the thirty-seven personnel are killed because of this pseudo-
scientific test of human blood purity. In their hysteria to be free of the monstrous other the 
men become monsters themselves. Focusing on the look, Rieder reads Campbell’s alien as a 
threat to individual identity: 
Its mental broadcasts displace the self from within, and its imitation both destroys 
the self’s uniqueness and undercuts any communal support for the embattled 
individuals. In this story the fundamental sign of the Other is the look. First in the 
alien’s baleful glare, and later in the men’s suspicious staring of one another, the 
look is the sign and vehicle of psychological aggression; it prefigures the savage 
violence against the alien which erupts at the story’s resolution. Conversely, what 
unites the men and the alien is the look, for it also signals the paramount instinctual 
need in this story: self-preservation . . . the plot, then, can only take place on the 
ideological terrain of an atomistic, aggressive individualism. (Rieder 1982, 31–32) 
Writing on contagion in regard of the gaze of the Other, Lavender III states that 
transference of fear occurs through the gaze. Fear of illness and death is replaced by 
a fear of difference and change because of the potential for harm that contact with 
the other represents—something, perhaps, unclean. A new truth is established as 
fear of the other becomes contagious through the perception of visual differences. 
Thus, to be contagious is to be feared as other. (Lavender III, 121)  
The men in the story fear the look and gaze of the alien-other, which is to say they fear that 
they themselves will be reflected in, and so become what they themselves have designated 
as evil and impure. Because the alien is bereft of speech, a mute thing, this becoming thus 
leads from an “unclean” exteriority to a perverted interiority through the trope of 
“contagion,” which is to say, transference occurs by way of close proximity: a mere look and 
a touch. Further, the alien blood that tries to self-preserve when confronted by a deadly live 
wire mirrors the scientists that likewise self-preserve by seeking to halt the contagion, 
even if it means killing members of their own team, which suggests a weaving of the alien 
and the human rather than a clear-cut division. However, passed the beginning of the story, 
the alien has for all intents and purposes physically vanished and all that that remains are 
the men themselves. Thus, the human-nonhuman, self-other opposition collapses in on 
itself. All that is left in the end is the “atomistic, aggressive individualism” of the white, male 
scientists themselves. 
I would like to return here to the story’s geographical setting of Antarctica, which 
comments further on the scientist’s all-or-nothing dualistic thinking of the human that 
reflects the genre’s human/nonhuman binary. The alien, we are told, is discovered at the 
point “exactly over the South Magnetic Pole of the Earth” (Campbell, 292). The text, then, is 
set directly on the north/south opposition, which denotes extreme polarization, with the 
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south part tellingly posing as a threat to the north part, i.e., the entire planet. Through its 
own deadly and blinding white terrain, the text is to a degree aware of its own situated 
polarization. Here, the whiteness of the setting is indeed extreme, as is the binary thinking 
of the scientists themselves. The fact that women are completely effaced from the story 
(the only human agents are white males) further speaks to the text’s polarizing and rigid 
mentality. The plasticity of the thing’s materiality brings to mind the plasticity of the female 
body and its ability to engender racialized difference, which further suggests the thing is 
not only racialized but also gendered as well. Moreover, the “south magnetic pole” indicates 
a literal limit to scientific exploration to the self and the world. Interestingly, it is at the 
limits of human-cum-white understanding and knowledge of the world that the men 
encounter a limitless, ever expanding and ultimately indigenous entity that seemingly 
violates all scientific laws. One can draw from here that it is at the borders that 
transgressions take place both in the story and the genre of SF in general, which bring us to 
those very borders and limitations only to transgress established “natural laws” imposed 
by Man. And yet, what the white men encounter in the alien is the liminal shadow side of 
their own humanity. When the men first find the alien they also find a spaceship that is 
accidentally destroyed, but not before the men see “black bulks,” and count “three other 
shadow-things that might have been—passengers—frozen there. Then the ice came down 
and against the ship” (296, emphasis mine). 
This description captures what the aliens-as-shadow-things represent—the shadow 
of blackness that whiteness casts and indeed needs in order to sustain itself. Here, I am of 
course drawing on Toni Morrison’s analysis of American literature and criticism, in her 
book Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination. Morrison dissects how 
what she terms “a fabricated Africanist presence,” which is the “thunderous, theatrical 
presence of black surrogacy—an informing, stabilizing, and disturbing element” is crucial 
to the work of major American writers (13). Speaking of this bound presence in the 
blinding white terrains of American fiction, she writes 
Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or 
Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these images 
of blinding whiteness seem to function as both an antidote for and meditation on the 
shadow that is companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that 
moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. (33) 
For Morrison, the very concept of human freedom in the formation of American 
literature—and indeed of the entire nation—is inevitably tied to slavery, and she goes on to 
observe that “Black slavery enriched the country’s creative possibilities. For in that 
construction of blackness and enslavement could be found not only the not-free but also, 
with the dramatic polarity created by skin color, the projection of the not-me. The result was 
a playground for the imagination” (38, emphasis mine). This “projection of the not-me,” in 
canonical American texts takes on the shape of mystifying and terrifying alien forms as it 
migrates into the genre of SF, all the while continuing to be informed by the “dynamic 
polarity created by skin color.” As disturbing and fear-laden as it appears to be, this 
projection serves to inform and stabilize the notion of the human, the not-alien, in all its 
“mute, meaningless, unfathomable, pointless, frozen, veiled, curtained, dreaded, senseless, 
[and] implacable” whiteness (Morrison, 59). 
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And yet the alien-shadow serves as a creolizing force that disrupts the whiteness of 
the human/text, calling into question set notions of the human and revealing the 
human/alien as in fact being two sides of the same coin, one containing the other: no 
extension but no separation either. In its own way, Campbell’s text offers this warning: 
extreme polarization leads to extreme and blinding violence that is directly tied to white 
paranoia and the all-or-nothing myth of purity, which points to “what racial ideology does 
to the mind, imagination, and behavior of masters” (Morrison, 12). In the story the very 
idea of mixture with an alien form, no matter how powerful, is intolerable because it 
operates by the extreme polarization of the politics of racial purity and the logic of 
colonialism itself. Either one is completely free of alien blood and purely human, or the 
smallest amount of alien blood renders one a total “inhuman monster” that must be 
destroyed at all cost. There can be no sustained interaction between the two. And yet a 
close reading of the text flips the script and reveals the inhuman resides within the human, 
and vice versa, the human likewise resides in the inhuman. Through this reading, the genre 
of SF allows us the possibility to not only posit humanity in what we construe as 
fundamentally alien but also posit that dark and obscure alien element squarely within the 
human itself. With the unearthing of this “unearthly” alien that has been bound since the 
first arctic freezing of the planet, no matter how hard they resist it, Campbell’s scientists 
must contend with the fact that division between self and other is no longer as clear cut as 
they might still wish it to be; the “contagious” alien has rendered such a border porous and 
ambiguous. 
Creolizing the Genre(s) of Man 
One can well state that the primary function of the alien in science fiction is precisely this: 
to render the border between self and other porous and ambiguous. But the calling into 
question of scientific as well as metaphysical borders is also a function of the SF genre as a 
whole, which can be read as being alien onto itself in its ongoing creolizing and 
shapeshifting composition. While white male authors historically may have taken 
dominance over the genre through much of the previous century, blanketing it with racist 
colonial ideology, the genre like the alien itself is “impure” through its hybridity and 
plasticity and thus subverts such ideology by turning it on its head. I believe this also helps 
to explain the division the U.S. academy polices in its liminal assignation of the SF genre as 
“popular” as opposed to “literary” fiction, not worthy of the same level of study as so-called 
high literature. As noted earlier, the name itself already indicates an illicit blending of 
science and literature, of fact and myth, which crosses multiple disciplinary lines, and as 
Gordon explains, the “cross-fertilization of distinctive disciplinary developments” within 
the academy tends to be “averted by a repugnance” that treats “the products as crude, 
deformed impurities” (Gordon, 4). The SF genre is treated as a “crude, deformed impurity” 
because of its hybridity and plasticity but also of the “crossbreeding and intermixture” of 
multiple disciplines that then gets read as a bastardization, and so relegated to, as James 
Edward puts it, the “ghetto” of the literary establishment (James, 6). A look at the genre’s 
muddled and multiple beginnings reveals further cross-fertilization with a range of literary 
forms such as romance, fantasy, gothic fiction and horror, and other generic mixtures that 
SF continues to forge in order to evolve. It is also multimodal, capable of traveling 
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seamlessly from pulp magazines to novels to film, television and video games (for an 
examination of how the genre applies across the range of these cultural forms, see Milner, 
1–22). Such crossings mark the creolizing technological praxis of the genre that puts into 
play multiple categories at once while never privileging one over another, meaning there is 
no hierarchy here, and no all-or-nothing thinking of “pure categories” (disciplinary or 
otherwise). Rather it calls into question dualistic ways of being in and perceiving the world. 
Such dynamic hybridity, moreover, creates ambiguity, which is why those who do study the 
genre have to deal with its contradictory definitions. Simply put, among many theories, 
there is no critical consensus on what science fiction actually is and the ambiguity seems to 
rest on its obscure origins. 
Noting the disagreement and lack of critical consensus of the genre’s origin has led 
the scholar Paul Kincaid to declare that the genre is “indefinable” in its multiplicity. He 
argues in his influential essay, “On the Origins of Genre,” that SF is “not one thing, but 
many” and because “there is not one definition of science fiction but many . . . not one 
urtext [origin] but many” it is simply “indefinable” (411). Because of the rhizomatic nature 
of its dynamic hybridity, although Kincaid does not name SF as such, “we cannot extract a 
unique common thread which we could trace back to a unique common origin” (413). And 
yet there is unity; SF still coheres due to an “identifiable pattern” that is in a “state of 
constant flux” and that a definition would try to “fix,” (414) but as he asserts, no definition 
of science fiction “has successfully managed to encompass all that it is, all that it has been, 
and all that it might be” (414). This again speaks to the pliability and dynamism of not only 
the literary genre but also the human genre, that it is constantly “in flux” and cannot be 
“fixed” by any one definition. Kincaid further elaborates that SF is not one but 
any number of things—a future setting, a marvelous device, an ideal society, an alien 
creature, a twist in time, an interstellar journey, a satirical perspective, a particular 
approach to the matter of story, whatever we may be looking for when we look for 
science fiction, here more overt, here more subtle—which are braided together in 
an endless variety of combinations. (417)  
He sees science fiction itself as a weaving together of disparate elements—“a series of 
strands” which when “braided together in any of a possibly infinite number of 
combinations, make what we have come to recognize as science fiction” (417). In other 
words, science fiction is itself a dynamic mixture that further produces “endless” mixtures, 
creolizing everything in its path and along the way effing the law of purity and revealing 
itself to be contaminating as well as contaminated by the other it touches. Kincaid further 
asserts that “it is not in the heartland of science fiction that definitions, or family 
resemblances, are an issue, but on the borders, where science fiction is changing into 
something else, or something else is changing into science fiction” (415). Kincaid here 
speaks to the open boundaries of the genre itself through which the alien element can enter 
and provide SF what it needs to mutate and evolve. The borders here are not erased but 
rendered porous—it is the place of contact with the other that transforms the essence of a 
thing perpetually, emphasizing an essential becoming. It is such ungovernable mutability of 
both genre and selfhood that greatly troubles the whiteness and “humanity” of Campbell’s 
text. 
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As with science fiction as Kincaid articulates it, creolization points toward what 
Monahan elucidates as “a telos without a terminus.” He further elaborates: 
Just as liberation cannot be understood a state to be achieved, so too is creolization, 
in this prescriptive sense, never something that we may accomplish and refer to as a 
fait accompli but only ever be a kind of norm that conditions our efforts without 
determining them. The call for [creolization] . . . is not directed toward some static 
terminus as an end state but rather points toward the characteristics of methods 
and practices that at once recognize and foster the fundamental human practices of 
creolization. It is an intellectual framework that foregrounds the ambiguity and 
hybridity that is understood not as a weakness or obstacle to our political and 
epistemic efforts but rather as a condition for the possibility of human existence as 
freedom. (Monahan 2017, 7) 
The “telos without a terminus” of creolization must thus “entail the fostering of a more 
genuinely human world, where humanity is itself understood to be a hybrid, ambiguous, 
and dynamic process of ongoing creolization, but where each moment of creolization 
stands as the open possibility or even invitation to yet further such moments” (7). Science 
fiction as an explicit creolizing and “living” genre that inhabits “a flexible and dynamic field 
of semantic tension” (Rose, 49) and maintains open its borders as a necessary condition for 
its existence, allows us to envision alien worlds that help us to understand the “hybrid, 
ambiguous, and dynamic process of ongoing creolization” that more accurately reflects 
humanity itself. The genre’s ‘creolizing technological praxis,’ as I have termed it here, 
allows for new ways of being and interacting with others (and otherness itself) in a cosmos 
that is dynamically interwoven and future-oriented. As a “non-realist” genre what I believe 
gives science fiction its power and strength is its ability to mirror the world not as it is, but 
as it can be. And yet, through its creolizing construction and praxis, in its own way it more 
accurately mirrors the reality of self and world: that we are all “braided” together 
constantly in “flux”: always in the process of becoming something other than what we are 
now. But specifically, it is through the reflection of the shapeshifting alien that humanity 
can be viewed as a “process” that resists epistemic closure and opens itself up to the 
possibility of human liberation and the freedom to be other unto itself. 
The common reaction to the alien in SF contagion narratives, set forth by Campbell’s 
founding and influential novella explored here, reflects on the capacity of the darker side of 
human nature to annihilate and destroy different ways of being in the world. In fact, it 
reflects zero tolerance for difference in and of itself, since that is what the alien, in its 
capacity to endlessly shift shape, represents. And in the western world, difference has 
nowhere else been more marked than in the enslaved black body, which was, to use 
Morrison’s term, “visible to a fault” (Morrison, 49). The fear of contagion, i.e., dis-ease 
spread by intermixture with the alien-ness of blackness in all its manifestations, is the fear 
of losing one’s grip on “humanity,” or what amounts to losing the hold on the “exclusionary 
moral, material, and aesthetic norm passing itself off as the universal truth of the human” 
(Monahan, 84). Through its dehumanizing politics of purity and colonial all-or-nothing way 
of thinking, such zero tolerance of other forms of humanity also speaks to the incredible 
appetite and greed of Man, to his greediness in wanting to keep the category of the human 
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all to himself and being unwilling to share the world with other “alien” beings. And whether 
these alien beings are of terrestrial or extraterrestrial origin, actual Homo sapiens or not, 
makes no difference. And yet, through the open borders of the SF genre, the alien 
persistently enters and reenters our dreams and our nightmares. As Campbell’s story 
illustrates, the alien inevitably surfaces, offering a reflection of aspects of our humanity that 
have been frozen, buried, and kept in suspension by an icy cold whiteness. And while the SF 
narrative of contagion is one that vilifies and demonizes the alien’s embodied difference, 
other narratives acknowledge such alterity as a benefactor of humanity (i.e., Arthur C. 
Clarke’s Childhood End [1953] and Octavia E. Butler’s trilogy Lilith’s Brood [2000]). Such 
narratives posit the human not as a static and given genre, but as an open, living one 
capable of metamorphoses, and it is the alien difference that assists and is required for 
such profound transformation to occur. But this necessitates at the very least an openness 
to “creolizing technologies” that can lead us to alien ways of becoming human and take us 
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